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21 Introduction
“... because I think that love,
real love, has got nothing to do
with statistics...”
Meetic advert [translated from the French]
Do risk-lovers tend to choose partners who share their love of risk? And what about
the other dimensions of individual preference? In other words, do couples share the same
values? This is the question, as yet somewhat neglected, that we address in this paper.
The literature in the social sciences has underlined the existence of a strong similarity
between spouses in terms of education, income and inherited wealth. But few studies
have investigated the question of similarity in more subjective characteristics such as
individual preferences, and in particular those involving saving and wealth management
decisions (risk aversion, preference for the present, altruism, etc.). The existing theo-
retical works predict heterogamy in attitudes to risk; in other words, risk-lovers should
choose risk-averse partners. In addition to better identifying the choice of spouse and em-
pirically testing the validity of these models, this question plays a role in other important
debates, such as how to explain wealth inequalities. On this subject, two well-established
conclusions have been highlighted by the economic literature.
Firstly, homogamy increases wealth inequalities between households and also affects
intergenerational mobility. The similarity between spouses in terms of education, in-
come or inherited wealth leads to a concentration of wealth among households. Along
these lines, Atkinson (1975) showed that perfect homogamy would be equivalent to every
brother, in each family, marrying his sister, his female “clone”.
Secondly, preferences for saving explain a significant part of the differences in house-
hold wealth. Wealth accumulation can be driven by several different motives, notably
precautionary, life-cycle and bequest considerations. Ceteris paribus, the individuals who
are most sensitive to these motives will tend to save and therefore accumulate more
wealth. However, some papers defend the reverse causality and show that wealth can
3affect preferences.
The first aim of this article is to reconcile these two strands of literature by examining
the relationship between spouses in terms of risk and time preferences. But this work also
provides a useful contribution to the analysis of the formation of preferences and their
transmission between generations. The literature on this subject is scarce and very recent,
and many questions remain unexplored. By studying homogamy in terms of attitudes to
risk and time, we are focusing on the stage which precedes the formation and transmission
of preferences, but which may nevertheless be helpful for understanding them.
One of the difficulties of our analysis lies in the measurement of individual preferences.
Conventional measurements like lotteries or self-evaluation scales have several drawbacks.
The criticisms that are levelled at them fall into two categories: lotteries are accused of
being too abstract or artificial, while scales can be judged irrelevant and imprecise. In
this paper, we use a new indicator that overcomes these defects, proposed by Arrondel
and Masson (2013) and based on a method of scoring. In particular, this new measure-
ment of preferences turns out to perform better than the conventional measurements in
its capacity to explain wealth management decisions, stability over time, statistical prop-
erties, etc. To implement this new method, we draw on an original survey (PATER).
In addition to the sociodemographic and economic description of each household, this
survey contains a large number of questions aiming to measure savers’ preferences on the
basis of the different methodologies (lottery, scale and score). Using the many questions
available, we have constructed synthetic and ordinal scores for each individual, in order
to measure their attitudes to risk and time.
We observe a similarity between partners in their attitude to risk, whatever the indi-
cators used. The correlation between individuals’ preferences is positive and significant,
ranging from 0.2 or 0.3 for lotteries and scales to 0.5 for the scoring method. Homogamy
is also present in terms of life-cycle motives, with similar results for the correlations. The
similarity of spouses’ attitudes to risk and time only slightly grows with the age of spouses.
Young (and so recent) couples are barely less similar than old couples. This effect of time
is almost absent for risk attitudes but more pronounced for time attitudes like patience
4and, to a lesser extent, foresight. Our results suggest that most of the positive correlation
between spousal preferences comes from marital sorting.
Econometric analysis shows that this homogamy in psychological profiles remains valid
even when we take the other individual characteristics of spouses into account, such as
age, social background and position, religious beliefs, etc. The choice of spouse according
to time or risk preferences turns out to be primarily a matter of taste. These results
also shed light on the mechanism by which preferences are transmitted from parents to
children, by showing that both parents play a role in the transmission of values.
Another important contribution of this article is that it points up the implications of
these results in terms of wealth inequalities. Preferences with regard to time and risk
may have a direct effect on wealth accumulation (people who are more precautionary,
farsighted and altruistic accumulate more wealth) but the reverse causality may also
exist. The mutual attraction between people with similar savings profiles can reinforce
“vicious” or “virtuous” circles.
Section 2 relates our work to the existing literature. We then address the theoret-
ical approach to savers’ preferences before introducing the data and the different ways
of measuring these preferences. In section 5, we present the results, starting with the
measurements of homogamy, before concluding with a discussion about the interpreta-
tion and the implications of our findings.
2 The homogamy of preferences: a question neglected
by the socioeconomic literature
The aim of this article is to study the extent of homogamy with regard to risk and time
preferences. The origins of the economic literature on the question of the choice of spouse
lie in the works of Becker (1973, 1974 and 1981). One of the questions that arises is
whether maximisation of the household’s production function depends on complementar-
ity or substitutability between the spouses. The existing empirical works generally focus
on dimensions such as income (Becker 1981, Lam 1988, Zimmer 1996, Zhang and Liu
52003, Nakosteen et al. 2004 among others), education (Pencavel 1998, Fernandez et al.
2005, Schwartz and Mare 2005, Chiappori et al. 2011) and to a lesser extent inherited
wealth (Charles et al. 2013, Fre´meaux 2013). Many sociological works have examined this
question (Girard 1964, Bertaux 1977, Bozon 1991, Kalmijn 1991, Arrondel and Grange
1993, Pinc¸on and Pinc¸on-Charlot 1997). Most of the results support the idea of similarity
between spouses, although the degree of similarity may vary from one dimension to an-
other. The differences between the methods used and the samples to which the analyses
apply make it difficult to rank the importance of the dimensions mentioned above. Nev-
ertheless, one can say that the respective levels of education of the two spouses are more
similar than their incomes or their inherited wealth (where the correlations lie between
0.1 and 0.31 and 0.2-0.4 respectively).
Several papers tackled the issue of the shared values in couples. Specifically, Weiner
(1978) considers the political preferences while Bisin et al. (2004) focus on the religion.
Biological and medical research papers look at personality traits probably more closely
related to our research question. A non-exhaustive list of works includes Feng and Baker
(1994) about general attitudes and well-being, McLeod (1995) about psychological dis-
orders, Krueger et al. (1998) about antisocial behavior, Speakman et al. (2007) and
Reynolds et al. (2006) about health related behaviors (obesity and tobacco/alcohol con-
sumption). Other authors have studied the psychological characteristics of the spouses.
For example, Mascie-Taylor and Vanderberg (1988) and Smith et al. (2010) find positive
correlations for cognitive abilities. Again, most papers provide evidence of positive assor-
tative mating even if the endogeneity of some values is not always properly considered.
In that case, the influence of partners or the potential selection effect cannot be ruled
out.
Research works analysing homogamy in terms of savings preferences are much scarcer.
Chiappori and Reny (2006) develop a theoretical analysis of the marriage market from the
perspective of attitudes to risk. They predict that the most risk-loving individuals should
take the most risk-averse spouses so that risk-taking within the household is balanced
1However, certain works, like Zhang and Liu (2003), find a negative correlation between the spouses’
wages, when education and age are controlled for.
6(risk-sharing). To our knowledge, only Dohmen et al. (2012) and Kimball et al. (2009)
have empirically tested the presence of selective matching on these variables of preference.
In the first article, using self-evaluation scales, the authors obtain a correlation between
spouses of 0.4 for risk aversion and slightly more (0.45-0.5) for trust.2 In the second
article, risk preferences are measured by means of lotteries and the correlation obtained
is of the same order.
In line with the literature on non-unitary models (Chiappori, 1992; Browning, 2000,
among others), several papers consider households in which spouses have different pref-
erences. Mazzocco (2004) concentrates on savings in households where the spouses have
opposite risk attitudes. His findings are counter-intuitive. Firstly, the couples with op-
posite attitudes can save more than the others. Secondly, an increase in the prudence of
one spouse can lead to a fall in the prudence of the household and consequently in its
level of savings. Jouini et al. (2013) extend this analysis by modeling the risk attitude of
a group of heterogenous agents. More specifically, they show that an increase of the level
of risk tolerance of one agent may have an ambiguous effect on the aggregate level of risk
tolerance depending on the levels of aggregate wealth. Yilmazer and Lich (2013) focus
on the allocation of financial assets. They find that the share of risky assets increases as
the risk tolerance of the spouse who has more bargaining power increases. The research
work presented in our paper is above all empirical, but it does shed some light on the
decision-making process within the household and more precisely within the couple. Ex-
amining the degree of similarity between the spouses in this respect gives us some idea of
the extent to which there is cooperation or, on the contrary, negotiation between the two
spouses. Therefore, our results may indicate whether non-unitary models are relevant for
studying the household decisions regarding wealth.
The choice of spouse is closely linked to the intergenerational transmission of capital
(economic, human, etc.) and preferences. The choice of spouse has long-term effects,
because it affects not only what will be transmitted from parents to children but also
the very mechanism of transmission. Solon (1992) pioneered empirical research on this
2By “trust”, the authors mean trust in others, the willingness to rely on other members of society.
7subject, estimating intergenerational elasticities of income between parents and children3.
Several articles have focused on the similarity of preferences between parents and children.
Jellal and Wolff (2002) carry out a quantitative analysis of the transmission of character-
istics related to altruism. Based on self-evaluation scales, Dohmen et al. (2012) extend
this kind of study to attitudes to risk, and they obtain positive correlations. Knowles
and Postlewaite (2005) find that the propensity to plan for the future is transmitted from
parents to children. Charles and Hurst (2003) and Arrondel (2013) make the connec-
tion between the transmission of preferences and the intergenerational wealth elasticity.
These two articles demonstrate the existence of positive correlations between parents and
children for both wealth and preferences but they diverge about the explanatory power
of preferences in the wealth elasticity4.
Recently, several articles have attempted to estimate the importance of the choice
of spouse in explaining economic inequalities (and their persistence), focusing mainly on
incomes (Kremer 1997, Chadwick and Solon 2002, Fernandez et al. 2005 Ermisch et
al. 2006, Raaum (2007). For example, Ermisch et al. (2006) estimate that homogamy
explains slightly less than half the income elasticity between parents and children. In
this article, we seek to bring to light the role of preferences in the choice of spouse and
intergenerational transmission.
3 The standard theory of the saver and the choice of
spouse
Before describing and illustrating our method for measuring savers’ preferences, let us
address the problem of the number of parameters of taste that should be introduced.
The standard life-cycle model assumes that saving behaviour is independent and
prospective: the subject only looks ahead (towards the future), neither behind (to the
past) nor to the sides (what the neighbours are doing). Proof of rationality, his choices
3See Black and Devereux (2011) for a survey.
4The share of elasticity explained by preferences is 4 to 5 times greater for Arrondel than it is for
Charles and Hurst
8are also time-consistent: if his expectations are verified over time, his initial consump-
tion plan is implemented as anticipated and not modified.5 Under these hypotheses, the
standard model, which is very parsimonious, only uses the three parameters of preference
relating to the dimensions of risk, time and family:
• The (relative) aversion to risk determines in particular the level of precautionary
saving and the share of low-risk assets in the portfolio: the higher the risk aversion,
the larger (proportionally) the risk or insurance premium the agent is willing to pay
to cover himself against a given risk;
• The time discount rate over the life cycle or the degree of preference for the present,
which reduces the importance attached to satisfaction of the future self compared
with that of the present self, causes an equivalent reduction in the decision horizon
of an agent with a given life expectancy: saving for retirement varies inversely with
this parameter;
• The degree of family“altruism”, in other words the importance attached to the well-
being of one’s children compared with the satisfaction derived from consumption
for oneself, determines the strength of the transmission motive.6
The life-cycle model thus identifies three main motives for the accumulation of house-
hold wealth: precaution, linked to “prudence” and risk aversion; intertemporal smoothing
of consumption and saving for retirement, which is a function of the degree of “foresight”;
and the wealth destined for transmission, which depends on the degree of family altruism;
in this context, the choice of portfolio depends above all on the level of risk aversion.
However, it is now accepted that this basic model is inadequate for describing savers’
behaviour: in particular, other parameters of preference are needed in order to take into
5A famous counter-example is that of Ulysses and the Sirens, where Ulysses suffers a lack of self-
control of which he is perfectly aware. Facing a conflict of personality (or of preferences) between his
present self and his future self, the former places the latter (who will want to swim to the Sirens) under
tutelage by having himself tied to the mast.
6Technical note: the standard model assumes a time-additive and isoelastic utility function with an
exponential discount rate (the time discount rate may depend on age but not on the distance from the
present). Under uncertainty, the saver maximizes his expected utility. The inverse of the intertem-
poral substitution elasticity, the constant parameter of relative risk aversion determines the degrees of
“prudence” for precautionary saving and of “temperance” for the management of multiple risks.
9account their limited rationality. Thus, both theory and data lead us to adopt four
parameters of preference:7
• γ represents attitudes to risk (aversion, prudence, etc.);
• δ represents long-term preference for the present, in other words the time discount
rate over the life cycle;
• β represents short-term impatience, which generally testifies to time-inconsistent
choices (limited rationality) related to a weakness of will or lack of imagination -
see Laibson (1997);
• θ measures the degree of family altruism, in other words the importance attached
to one’s children’s well-being rather than one’s own consumption.
For each (type of) preference that we seek to measure - attitude to risk (γ), preference
for the present (δ), short-term impatience (β), family altruism (θ) -, we have selected a
priori a certain number of questions; some of them, of a polysemous nature, have been
assigned to two indicators at the same time, notably γ and δ (the future is both uncertain
and distant from the present).
In this paper, we look at the preferences of the two partners. The basic question
we address is: should we observe a similarity of preferences between spouses? Actually,
the theoretical predictions are far from being straightforward. Classical marriage models
(Becker 1974, 1981) predicts negative assortative mating between some spouses’ traits
like income but this has more to do with skills than with preferences. Chiappori and
Reny (2006) tackle this issue and predict that risk sharing leads to negative assortative
mating. People exploit their comparative advantage by matching people with opposite
preferences in terms of risk. As a consequence, we could expect spouses attitudes to risk
to be largely different. The potential problem of this model is that the sole motivation of
matching is to share risk.
7For a justification of this choice, see Arrondel and Masson (2013).
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However, intuitively there are several reasons why we would expect positive assorta-
tive mating. If people share the same tastes, they are more likely to meet. Moreover,
the fact to agree on decisions regarding the household (economic, children’s education...)
also makes the couple less likely to get separated, implying attrition effects. In line
with Dohmen et al. (2012), an intergenerational motive may also be invoked to predict
positive assortative mating. If people have a preference for children with attitudes sim-
ilar to their own, they should be determined in being in couple with someone with risk
and time attitudes also close to their own. Finally, agreements that create gains from
co-insurance among spouses with opposite preferences may be difficult to enforce. In-
deed, with co-insurance partners could decouple income risk from consumption allocation
by establishing state-contingent budget shares depending on each partner’s preference.
However, imperfect information and informal contracts in families may make difficult the
enforcement of such contracts. As a consequence, model including these features could
predict positive assortative mating.
Thus, there is no consensus regarding the eventuality of substitutability or comple-
mentarity on spouses’ preferences relative to risk and time. As a consequence, our con-
tribution is to provide an empirical validation of one of these two competing hypotheses.
4 The PATER survey and the measurement of sav-
ings preferences
Fruit of an experiment lasting nearly fifteen years, our body of data is composed of five
successive surveys, the main aim of which was to study the wealth of households in parallel
to their preferences in terms of saving (risk aversion, preference for the present, altruism,
etc.). In this article, we only use the 2007 wave of the census, which allows us to make a
direct comparison between the two partners. In this section we shortly present the data
and describe the methodology. Appendix A provides more detailed information about
the scoring method.
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4.1 Presentation of the data
Conducted by the INSEE (French National Institute for Statistics and Economic Stud-
ies) in 1998, the first PATER survey8 was a complementary module to the “Patrimoine
1998 ” survey. The four subsequent PATER surveys (2002, 2007, 2009 and 2011) were
commissioned from the TNS-Sofres institute on a representative sample of the French
population. Unlike the other waves, the 2007 survey applied the questionnaire to each
member of the couple separately9, to better analyse the financial decision-making process
in the household. We therefore use this wave in order to estimate the degree of similarity
between spouses.
The information collected in the different surveys (including 2007) involves a sociode-
mographic description of the household, the value, composition and management of its
wealth, an inventory of its incomes, the existence of intergenerational transfers given or
received, together with more subjective data about expectations of growth and risk (at
five years, for example) on personal income and the price of assets. The survey contains
a large number of more qualitative questions aiming to measure individual preferences
with respect to risk and time (lottery choices) but also according to attitudes (opinions
and behaviour in different areas of life).
4.2 Measuring savers’ preferences: the different methods
Each PATER questionnaire (from 1998 to 2011) includes a series of measurements of
preferences obtained using different methods. Two of these methods, the “conventional”
ones, are proposed in the literature. The third is the product of an original approach,
based on a procedure of scoring, which have been developed and improved between 1998
and 2011.
8PATER for “Pre´fe´rences et Patrimoines face au TEmps et au Risque” (“preferences and wealth in
relation to time and risk”).
9In 2007, there are a total of 3826 households in our sample (including 2417 couple-headed households);
for 905 of them, the questionnaire was applied to each member of the couple (with a period of time
between the two partners). We focus on this specific subsample
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4.2.1 The traditional methods: lotteries and scales
We shall not describe in detail the measurements used in this article (for a detailed
review of these traditional measurements of preferences, see Arrondel and Masson, 2013).
As far as attitudes to risk are concerned, one of the most well-known and widely used
measurements is that of relative risk aversion pioneered by Barsky et al. (1997). It
is based on hypothetical lottery choices concerning the individual’s permanent income.
The individual is proposed different job contracts in place of his actual one, generating
a life-cycle income Y. In the first question, the contract proposed is the following: the
individual has a 0.5 probability of earning 2Y and a 0.5 probability of only earning 2/3 Y.
If the individual is willing to participate in this first lottery, he is proposed a second, more
risky lottery, where the probabilities remain the same but the scale of the loss increases,
since he now has a 0.5 probability of only earning 1/2 Y. If he refuses the first lottery,
he is proposed a second, less risky one, where the probabilities of winning or losing still
remain the same but in the event of loss, his income only falls by 20%. In the end, this
method allows individuals to be classified into four categories, from the most risk-averse
to the most risk-tolerant.
Other measurements of the attitude to risk ask the interviewee to place himself on a
scale from 0 to 10, according to what he perceives to be his attitude to risk: 0 corresponds
to “very prudent” and 10 to “audacious” (the two items are described in greater detail).
These self-evaluation scales ranging from 0 to 10 can be asked “in general” (as in the
PATER survey) or for specific areas of life: health, sport and leisure, work, finance, etc.
(Dohmen et al., 2012).
The measurements of preference for the present, and more precisely the time discount
rate, are not so robust, as demonstrated in the somewhat deprecatory survey by Frederick
et al. (2002). Nevertheless, we do have a self-evaluation scale of preference for the present
ranging from 0 (“taking each day as it comes”) to 10 (“concerned about the future”). These
scales also exist to measure patience, running from 0 for “very impatient” to 10 for “very
patient”.
Arrondel and Masson (2013), among others, highlight a number of shortcomings in
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these standard indicators. On the one hand, Barsky’s gambles only focus on professional
life and as a consequence, the respondent’s answer is influenced by his/her current situa-
tion. Moreover, lotteries can be also considered as too abstract or artificial because of the
substantial share of non-response and the high level of “noise” affecting the replies (low
correlation from one survey to the next). On the other hand, scales may be considered as
too generalised and irrelevant notably because of the subjects do not have any point of
reference for their evaluation. In their survey on the measurement of personality traits,
Borghans, Duckworth, Heckman and Well (2008) recommend “a multidimensional and
domain-specific approach” to the measurement of risk preferences. This is the solution
we use in the paper.
4.2.2 An original alternative method: the calculation of synthetic, ordinal
“scores”
The scoring method consists in calculating scores to “profile” individuals according to
their propensity for risk and the way they approach the future. The basic principal of the
scoring method is that no one question is by itself satisfactory. As a consequence, these
synthetic, ordinal scores are calculated on the basis of a large set of questions that cover
a wide range of areas of life, including consumption, leisure, investments, work, family,
health and retirement. In all, more than a hundred questions are used, of different kinds:
most of them, of a practical nature or relating to daily life, are questions about behaviour,
opinion or intentions which are relatively easy to answer; others concern reactions to
imagined scenarios or more abstract lottery choices. From these questions, the aim has
been to construct, for each survey, consistent relative indicators or “scores” of preferences
or attitudes in the four fields distinguished by theory: risk or uncertainty, the long term
(preference for the present), the short term (impatience), and the (family) altruism,
bearing in mind that the models often distinguish several parameters of preference within
each field10. Appendix A presents the set of questions used to built the scores.
10This is notably the case for risk or uncertainty, which may include aversions to risk, to loss and
to ambiguity, “temperance” (in the management of multiple risks), “pessimism” or “optimism” (in the
evaluation and subjective transformation of probabilities), etc.
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The first step consists in a priori allocation of each of the questions asked to one of the
four fields of preference. Inevitably, there is some overlapping, concerning the distinction
between short- and long-term, for example, and even more the fact that the future is
both uncertain and far-removed from the present.
More generally, when one seeks to interpret the answers given to these kinds of ques-
tions about daily life, one inevitably faces difficulties, notably due to effects of context
and non-relevant factors. For example, a risk-loving individual may avoid parking illegally
simply through civic-mindedness. Consequently, the idea underlying the new method is
that only the“average”of all the answers is significant, provided that the aggregate allows
us to more or less eliminate these elements of interference. As a second step, therefore,
the statistical method consists in encoding the answers, generally with three values. In
the case of time preference, for example, this would give: - 1 for a short-term view; 0
for a mid-term view; + 1 for a long-term view. For each individual, the “marks” thus
obtained are then added up. The final score is the sum of marks reduced solely to those
items which are seen, ex post, to form a statistically consistent whole.
So the scores are aggregate, qualitative and ordinal measurements, assumed to be
representative of the answers supplied by the survey to various questions. The problem
then arises of the number of different scores that should be introduced into each field of
preference, especially that of uncertainty. The (non-standard) theory identifies several
different parameters of preference in this field. The experimental data tend to show that
subjects do not react in the same way to small risks as they do to large risks, and one
cannot, therefore, consider the answers given to trivial questions of choice on the same
level as crucial decisions. Lastly, attitudes to risk are likely to vary from one area of life
to another: after all, paragliding and tax evasion are both risky activities, but they have
little else in common.
Here it is the data that have the last word. As far as risk is concerned, Arrondel and
Masson, aware of the problem, kept about sixty questions in the 1998, 2009 and 2011
waves and more in the 2007 wave. On the five PATER surveys, it is verified that one
sole score is always sufficient for an ordinal characterisation of the interviewee’s attitudes
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to risk and uncertainty (instead of the degree of his aversion to risk or prudence, or
his aversion to loss or ambiguity). Less surprisingly, preference for the present, short-
term impatience and altruism in favour of the children can each be characterised by one
sole representative score in each PATER sample. The constancy of these results already
reveals something of the robustness of the scoring method used.
This aggregation of answers also affects the interpretation of the scores. The exact
parameter measured (risk aversion or prudence for instance) is not a crucial issue as long
as the departure from expected utility and homothetic preferences is limited. The scores
measure a general attitude more than a specific parameter.
Arrondel and Masson (2013) show that the preferences measured by synthetic scores
perform better (in terms of explanatory power, stability, time correlation, etc.) than
conventional measurements, in particular lotteries and scales. Moreover, statistical tests,
like the Cronbach’s alpha or the principal component analysis (PCA), indicates that the
scores are internally consistent. For further details on the method of constructing scores
and their properties, see Appendix A and Arrondel and Masson (2013).
5 Birds of a feather?
5.1 What are the determinants of preferences?
Table 1 presents the distribution of the different indicators of time and risk preferences
for the 2007 wave of the survey. The aim here is to detail both the differences between
men and women and the effect of marital status on preferences. These results concern
the whole of the PATER 2007 sample, and not just the 905 couples. The table is divided
into three parts: in panel A, we use lotteries, in panel B, self-evaluation scales, and in
panel C, the scoring method.
This first descriptive analysis produces two main results. Firstly, there are differences
between men and women, and they are slightly less pronounced in the scores than in the
other two indicators. Whatever the method used, men are clearly more risk-tolerant than
women. Women are more altruistic and more patient and have a lower preference for the
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present than men. However, these differences between the genders are only significant
with the scoring method.11 These results are in keeping with the works of Andreoni and
Vesterlund (2001) for altruism and Powell and Ansic (1997) for risk aversion.
The second result concerns marital status. We observe no difference between married
and single individuals as far as patience is concerned. On the other hand, unmarried,
divorced and widowed individuals are generally less prudent, less farsighted and less
altruistic than married individuals. Several effects are involved here: age, the presence of
children and of course the presence of the spouse can explain these differences.
More generally, when we look at individual characteristics with regard to preferences,
the results, not presented in this table, are generally in the expected sense: men are more
risk-tolerant than women, and the young more than their elders; one is more likely to have
a long-term view (a low time preference) when one is older, more educated, married or has
children (and foresight also appears to be transmitted by the interviewee’s mother); one
is more altruist if one is educated; but the most impatient individuals over the short-term
do not have any particular characteristics.
General descriptive statistics are presented in appendix B, distributions of scores in
appendix C.
5.2 Opinions on homogamy
Many works have sought to measure the degree of homogamy in terms of income, social
origin or level of education (see section 2). However, the importance that individuals
themselves attach to homogamy is rarely studied. In the PATER survey, individuals
are asked about the role of homogamy as a factor of stability for the couple.12 Several
variables are detailed: income, social origin, political sensibility, religious or philosophical
orientations, tastes (leisure activities, lifestyle, etc.) and ethnic origin.
Table 2 presents the answers to this question, with the sample again broken down by
11The results in the form of regressions are presented in Appendix C.
12The exact wording of the question is the following: “In your opinion, apart from feelings, for a couple
to endure, it is preferable for the spouses to...”. This is followed by a list of the different dimensions
described in the text.
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gender and marital status. For 80% of interviewees, for a couple to endure it is preferable
for the spouses to share the same tastes. Then, in decreasing order of importance, come
social origin, religious or philosophical orientations, ethnic origin, political sensibility
and lastly income. It is interesting to see that a similar level of income is seen as a
source of stability by less than 20% of interviewees. Marital status and gender do not
change the order of preferences, but there are differences in terms of level. More than
social, religious or ethnic similarities, individuals are looking for spouses that share the
same lifestyle. However, the link between lifestyle and the other dimensions listed here
is strong, and may conceal a social or religious motivation, for example. Nevertheless,
this variable of taste is still the one that best approaches the concept of risk and time
preferences that we shall subsequently measure.
Is there homogamy concerning the opinion on homogamy? For each of the six variables
studied above, we have created matrices to measure the degree of similarity between
spouses (Tables 3a to 3f). The result is clear: people choose partners who have similar
opinions to their own. For example, 80% of the men who think that “for a couple to
endure, a similar social origin is preferable” are married to women who share the same
opinion (Table 3b). Thus, spouses generally share a similar opinion about the important
factors for the longevity of the couple. The Chi-square test provides us with a precise
evaluation of the independence of preferences. For each of the dimensions of homogamy,
independence between spouses is rejected.
In this first analysis, we see that the couples themselves consider tastes and lifestyles
to be key parameters for the stability of the couple, much more so than income or social
origin. The next part of the article examines whether this subjective judgement is verified
in the data.
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5.3 The relationship between spouses’ attitudes to time and
risk
In this section, the aim is not only to analyse the extent of the similarity between spouses’
preferences but also to compare the different measurements with each other. This com-
parison will allow us to relate our results to the existing work and to bring to light the
differences between measurements in a single sample.
5.3.1 Empirical strategy
The empirical strategy is the same for all measurements. To estimate the relationship
between spouses, we regress the measurement of preference of the male partner on that
of the female partner for all cohabiting married and non-married couples13.
PreferencesM = α + βPreferencesF + γX + u (1)
where X is a set of control variables and u is an error term. Estimates are from OLS
regressions.
In order to identify the correlation between preferences only and not between other
observed characteristics, we control for all the possible characteristics that can somehow
influence the correlations between preferences: age, education, occupation, social origin,
presence of children, inequality between spouses, religion, opinion regarding marriage,
type of city of residence... The complete list of control variables and their definition are
detailed in appendix D.1.
Last but not least, a crucial question is to determine whether the similarity between
spouses is the result of matching, of attrition or due to the influence of one spouse on
the other. The estimates on the whole sample provide information about the similarity
between partners for a population of surviving couples (i.e. the couples who are still
13We preferred this strategy in order to directly compare our estimates with the existing literature.
An alternative to this specification consists in estimating the Pearson’s r between partners’ preferences.
Our results remain unchanged.
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together at the time of the survey). This information is interesting but it is necessary
to know how similar were the partners when they met in order to measure the extent of
assortative mating and those of time or selection. To do so, we decompose the sample
according to the age of the male partner in three categories: under 40, between 40 and
60 and above 60 years old. It would have been ideal to know the date of formation of the
couple. In the absence of that variable in our data, we use the man’s age as an approxi-
mation of the duration of the couple’s relationship. Surveys with representative samples
of French couples14 confirm that the age of partners is an appropriate proxy. Specifically,
in 2010, the couples for whom the male partner is below 40 met less than 8 years before
the survey in average. This duration equals 22 years when the male partner is between
40 and 60 and 41 years when he is above 60. So young couples are significantly more
recent than couples with older male partners. In Appendix D.3 we implement robustness
tests to confirm the relationship between the partner’s and the couple’s age.
5.3.2 Lotteries
We start our comparison of spouses with Barsky lotteries. To compare them with the
other measurements used, we have made these measurements continuous. The differ-
ent possible combinations are encoded from 1 to 4 so as to create a progression in risk
tolerance.
This approach, adopting a continuous form, makes it easier to read the results, but
causes a loss of information on the degree of similarity between spouses at different points
on the distribution. The wording of the question allows us to classify individuals according
to their degree of risk tolerance as follows:
1. Reject both lotteries (L1)
2. Reject the first; accept the second (L2)
3. Accept the first; reject the second (L3)
4. Accept both lotteries (L4)
14The Patrimoine surveys built by INSEE
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Given the low numbers in categories L2, L3 and L4, we present a simplified matrix
(Table 4) by combining these three categories. The values presented along the diagonal
of the matrix, indicating the degree of similarity between the spouses, are high. Thus,
60% of the men who rejected both lotteries have spouses who made the same choice.
Independence between the spouses, again measured by the Chi-square test, is rejected.
The correlation, calculated from the four possible positions, provides us with a more
synthetic estimation of the similarity in the preference for risk (Table 5)15. We obtain a
statistically significant correlation (at the level of 1%) of 0.308. In column [2], we control
for all the possible characteristics that can somehow influence the relationship between
partners’ preferences: the correlation remains unchanged. Since Kimball et al. (2009) use
a similar measurement, we can conclude that homogamy in preferences, when measured
in this way, is slightly stronger in the United States than it is in France. A stronger taste
for a similarity of preferences, institutions (generosity of the French social system) but
also the measurement of preferences16 can explain this gap.
The results of the analysis by age categories suggest that correlation is already strong
for young couples, but it increases when the male partner is more than 60 years old (0.38).
When we control for individual and household characteristics (columns [4], [6] and [8]),
the effect of age is lower since the coefficient increases by 13% between the youngest and
the oldest households. The positive correlation for young couples suggests that partners
already have similar attitudes when they meet. There are several competing explanations
to explain why this similarity slightly grows with age. First, couples may become more
similar with age (by influencing each other) and as a consequence the correlation would
grow. Second, there may be a selection in place if couples whose members are similar
in tastes are more likely to survive. In this case, the couples with opposite attitudes
disappear from the sample when they get older. Third, it could be a cohort effect if the
preferences of older cohorts are more homogeneous. These explanations have very differ-
15To be consistent with Kimball et al. (2009), we regress the log of risk tolerance measured by the
lotteries and not the absolute value. However, the comparison with Kimball et al. (2009) is not perfect
given that, in absence of panel data, we cannot reproduce the ex post correction they implement.
16Kimball et al. (2009) use the panel dimension of their data to perform an ex post correction of
measurement issues.
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ent empirical and theoretical implications. Unfortunately, it is impossible to disentangle
between these theories in the absence of panel data (or of multiple cross sections).
5.3.3 Self-evaluation scales
The scales measure preferences differently, inasmuch as they are self-evaluated measure-
ments. So it is now the perception that individuals have of their own attitudes that serves
as the measurement. Three parameters are evaluated: patience, risk aversion17 and time
preference.18 Once again, we regress male partner’s preferences on those of female partner
to measure the presence of homogamy in the preferences studied.
Table 6 presents the correlations of these scales for our sample of 905 couples. In
columns [2], [4], [6] and [8], we add control variables to our specification. Again, we ob-
serve similarity between spouses in terms of risk attitude. Although they are not entirely
comparable with lotteries (because of differences in the possible amplitude of values), the
correlation of scales is slightly weaker. For patience, the correlation is negative, signif-
icant at the level of 10%, suggesting that the impatience of one spouse is offset by the
patience of the other. Finally, we observe a positive and significant coefficient of 0.29 for
time preference. The effect of age appears to vary from one dimension to another. While
the correlation in attitudes to risk is rather stable, the similarity in time preferences in-
creases with age. However, on top of the time/cohort/selection effects it is difficult to
know whether this change is due to the influence of the spouse or to the subjective nature
of the measurement, because of which an individual’s perception of his attitude to time
may change according to his age at the time of the survey (even if the attitude itself
remains unchanged). The control variables do not seem to affect the results for risk and
patience. However, for time preference, the effect of age is modified since the inverted
U-shaped curve disappears.
Once again, it is possible to compare these results with the existing works. Using
17However, the comparability remains limited, since the lotteries measure a relative aversion to risk
(under the hypothesis of CRRA preferences).
18In a concern for comparability between the scales and the scores, we use the neutral term of “time
preference” here to measure preference for the present.
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the same scales and (almost) similar controls19, Dohmen et al. (2012) find a correlation
between spouses of 0.35 (0.27 with controls). The degree of homogamy in attitudes to
risk therefore appears to be slightly lower in France than in Germany.
5.3.4 Scoring
The last type of measurement used is scoring. Four parameters are studied here: family
altruism, patience, risk aversion and time preference. In columns [2], [4], [6] and [8], we
add the full set of control variables to our specification. Table 7 presents the relationship
between the spouses’ scores. For each of the parameters, we observe a positive and
significant coefficient (at the level of 1% for each coefficient), but there are differences
in level. Homogamy is very strong for risk attitude, with a coefficient above 0.6. The
similarity between spouses is slightly weaker for time preference (0.5) and family altruism
(0.47) and weaker, but still largely positive, for patience (0.37).
Measured in this way, spouses appear to be much more similar than they are when
the measurement is based on one single question (lotteries or scales). This result is
reassuring in that there is consistency between all three methods in the results obtained
for the attitudes to risk and foresight. However, one noteworthy difference stands out
in these analyses. For patience, the correlations vary widely between scales and scores.
In this case, it seems that there is divergence between the two methods. Appendix D.2
examines this question in detail.
The analysis of the effect of age on the extent of similarity between spouses appears to
confirm the results obtained with the previous indicators. The similarity between spouses
in terms of attitude to risk is somehow “set” at the time the couple is formed since the
coefficients for men below 40 and for men above 60 are very close. For the parameters
involving time, the man’s age appears to have an effect that is more limited for altruism
and preference for the present (increase by 0.1) than for patience. For all preferences,
the effect of age significantly decreases when we include the control variables. All in all,
spouses’ attitudes to risk do not seem to converge or diverge over time, and for the param-
19See Appendix D.1
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eters involving time, there is some convergence, but this effect remains weak. Appendix
D.3 presents supplementary results. We implement the same econometric specifications
for younger couples (male partner’s age below 35) and we divide the sample of young
couples according to the presence of children20. The estimates confirm the existence of
positive assortative mating. In that sense, our findings are in line with Dohmen et al.
(2012) and Feng and Baker (1994) because these papers rule out attrition, convergence
and age covariation as explanations for homogamy of attitudes.
The control variables play a more substantial role for scores than for the standard
measurements. More specifically, the estimate for risk decreases from 0.635 to 0.443
when all the individual and household characteristics are controlled for. The size of this
reduction is less important for the attitudes to time. The effect of age is more limited
when all controls are added (except for patience). Appendix D.4 details the explanatory
power of each control variable and shows that the effect of age on risk and patience is
rather large. For time preference, income, occupation and religion are the most decisive
control variables while family characteristics and religion are crucial for altruism.
An interesting robustness test consists in replicating the study regarding the global
score on the different subscores computed for the different areas of life. For the risk
preference21, we built 6 subscores in order to consider separately each field: labour (and
retirement), family, financial managing, health, consumption and others. Table 8 presents
the results. We use the specification with the full set of controls. The estimate for the
general attitude is confirmed by positive and significant relationships for all subscores.
The coefficient is around 0.3-0.4 for family, financial managing, health and consumption
but slightly lower (and somehow expected) for labour and other. This finding confirms
the robustness of the similarity of preferences. It also provides evidence about the con-
sistency of the scoring method.
20The presence of children is a proxy for the couple’s age. Surveys based on a representative sample of
French couples indicate that the age of couples for whom the male partner is below 40 is around 5 years
in absence of children instead of 10 years if there is at least one child.
21The more limited number of questions for the other parameters does not allow us to replicate the
same analysis.
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The conclusion we can draw is that there is a positive assortative mating for risk and
time attitudes. The similarity we observe with standard measurements is consistent with
existing empirical evidence and it is more marked for scores. One of the contributions of
this paper is to show that the homogamy of preferences is also valid for time preferences.
Moreover, attrition or the common experience shared by spouses has a limited effect since
spouses’ attitudes do not seem to significantly converge or diverge over time. Placing these
results in perspective, we can see that homogamy in attitudes to risk and time is close to
homogamy in terms of education but much stronger than similar estimates in dimensions
such as labour income or inherited wealth, for which the correlations observed in France
are of the order of 0.2 (Fre´meaux, 2013).
The similarity between spouses remains high despite the addition of numerous con-
trols regarding many (objective or subjective) dimensions: demography, human or phys-
ical endowments, social prestige, social origin, religious or familial beliefs. Nevertheless,
the omitted variable bias may exist but it is likely to be limited. Compared with the
existing literature (more precisely with Dohmen et al., 2012), some control variables are
missing: physical aspects (height), health status and ethnicity. None of these dimensions
is available in our database22 but these variables play a minor role in Dohmen et al.’s
estimates. The low part that we succeed in explaining means that for all the dimensions
studied, it is chiefly preferences that explain the similarity between spouses. So for a
given social origin or position (among other things), individuals tend to choose a partner
who is very similar as regards attitudes to risk and time. The choice of partner in terms
of preferences therefore appears to be primarily a matter of tastes.
6 Discussion
The positive relationship for risk attitudes is at odds with the theoretical predictions
by Chiappori and Reny (2006). The taste for similar attitudes between partners seems
to overcome the potential gains to specialization arising from opposite attitudes. Our
22Actually, health related behaviors are included in scores that is why we do not add controls for the
respondent’ health status.
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results are in line with existing empirical work on the relationship between spouses’
preferences. Moreover, it is also important to consider the intergenerational transmission
of preferences to interpret this result. Arrondel (2013) provides evidence of a similarity
between parents and children for risk and time preferences. Although substitutability
between spouses’ attitudes is possible23, the existence of a transmission of preferences
from parents to children makes the similarity between spouses of previous generations
more likely notably because people may prefer to have children with similar preferences
to their own. As a consequence, this intergenerational motive creates an incentive to look
for a partner with similar preferences. On the question of transmission, Dohmen et al.
(2012) also show that mothers play a more important role than fathers, notably in the
transmission of trust.
The similarity of attitudes when partners meet but also when the couple gets old has
important implications about the joint decision process at the household level. Indeed,
our results suggest that spouses agree when they made saving decisions. In other words,
we can say that spouses probably cooperate more than they negotiate (at least for this
type of decisions). However, this paper does not mean that there exist only couples for
whom partners have similar attitudes and that we should simply add individual prefer-
ences to estimate household preferences. Heterogeneity within households may exist but
there is only a minority of couples with this profile. Besides, even when preferences are
homogenous, joint decisions are still more complex than individual decisions. The next
step in our work consists in providing empirical evidence to Mazzocco (2004)’s and Jouini
et al. (2013)’s models in order to understand better how joint saving decisions are made
by both homogenous and heterogenous households.
The interest of analysing the choice of spouse lies not only in estimating the ho-
mogamy, but also in examining its implications. The existing literature tackles this issue
either at the individual level (Arrondel and Masson, 2013) or from an intergenerational
perspective (Charles and Hurst, 2003; Dohmen et al., 2012; or Arrondel, 2013). Evidence
regarding the role of preferences at the household level are scarcer. Studying the extent
23The absence of homogamy would implied that intergenerational transmission is effected by only one
of the two parents.
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of assortative mating is the first step in estimating its overall effect on wealth inequality.
Similarity between spouses causes a divide in the population in terms of attitudes, since
for given individual characteristics, the spouses are very similar. The whole literature
about life cycle theory identifies risk and time preferences as parameters for wealth ac-
cumulation. Moreover, the general aim of the exogenous feature of the scoring method
is to identify the role of preferences24. Indeed, whatever the direction of causality, ho-
mogamy tends to reinforce the vicious and virtuous circles by “preventing” individuals
from balancing their attitude to risk or time against that of their spouse. Future research
should the study the impact of our findings of wealth accumulation and hence on wealth
inequality.
7 Conclusion
Homogamy has often been studied in terms of income, education and, to a lesser extent,
inherited wealth. Works focusing on the role of savings preferences in marital choices are
much scarcer. The main empirical analyses bring to light a similarity between spouses
in their attitudes to risk and time, contrary to the theoretical predictions. Moreover,
recent research has demonstrated that there is intergenerational transmission of these
same preferences.
This article has exploited an original survey that includes the standard measurements
of preferences and also allows the development of a scoring method. The different empir-
ical tests conducted in the article bring to light strong similarity in attitudes to time and
risk. The coefficients for measurements of risk are of the order of 0.2-0.3 for the conven-
tional measurements and 0.5 for the scores. The orders of magnitude are quite similar
for time preferences. For family altruism, measured solely by scores, the correlation be-
tween spouses is 0.45. For all indicators, we do not observe a significant divergence or
convergence of spouses’ attitudes over time. Indeed, the similarity of spouses’ attitudes
24One can also consider the reverse causality and think that wealth accumulation can have a direct
effect on time and risk preferences. Becker and Mulligan (1997) provide a model indicating that wealth,
among other factors, causes patience. However, the debate about the direction of the causality is beyond
the scope of this paper.
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to risk and time slightly grows with the age of spouses but the correlations are already
positive for young couples. This indicates that most of the similarity we observe comes
from marital sorting. Furthermore, the similarity between spouses remains strong despite
the addition of numerous controls (income, social position and origin, family status, ed-
ucation, religious opinions, etc.) meaning that for all the types of preferences studied, it
is mainly preferences that explain the similarity between spouses.
The other important contribution of this article, in relation to the existing literature,
is that it highlights the consequences of these results in terms of joint decision process and
wealth inequalities. This article opens up wide prospects for future research. It would be
interesting to relate this work more closely to collective choice models, in order to study
decisions taken by households in whom the spouses have contrasting, or on the contrary
very similar, attitudes. We could focus on the portfolio choice and on decisions affecting
household wealth, but also on broader themes related to the decision-making process in
the household.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of preference measurements
All Couples Unmarried, divorced or widowed
Men Women Difference Men Women Difference Men Women Difference
[1] [2] [1 - 2] [1] [2] [1 - 2] [1] [2] [1 - 2]
Panel A: Lotteries
L1 42.4% 46.3% -3.9 45.0% 45.0% 0.0 35.3% 48.7% -13.4
L2 26.0% 26.1% -0.1 25.6% 27.3% 1.6 26.9% 24.0% 2.9
L3 22.9% 20.3% -2.6 21.6% 20.8% 0.8 26.7% 19.4% 7.3
L4 8.7% 7.3% 1.4 7.8% 7.0% 0.8 11.1% 8.0% 3.1
Panel B: Scales
Prudent/Risk-loving 4.9 4.5 0.4 4.8 4.4 0.4 5.1 4.8 0.3
(2.33) (2.43) (2.36) (2.39) (2.22) (2.49)
Impatient/Patient 5.5 5.8 -0.3 5.5 5.7 -0.2 5.6 5.9 -0.3
(2.61) (2.54) (2.62) (2.50) (2.60) (2.62)
Myopic/Farsighted 6.4 6.8 -0.4 6.6 7.0 -0.4 5.9 6.4 -0.5
(2.62) (2.51) (2.58) (2.36) (2.85) (2.74)
Panel C: Scores
Family altruism 6.4 6.6 -0.2 6.5 6.7 -0.2 6.0 6.4 -0.4
(1.50) (1.39) (1.47) (1.38) (1.50) (1.41)
Impatience 4.2 4.0 0.2 4.2 3.9 0.3 4.2 4.0 0.2
(1.53) (1.43) (1.55) (1.40) (1.50) (1.47)
Risk aversion 5.7 6.2 -0.5 5.8 6.3 -0.5 5.4 6.1 -0.7
(1.39) (1.27) (1.41) (1.24) (1.31) (1.31)
Time preference 4.5 4.4 0.1 4.4 4.3 0.3 4.9 4.6 0.3
(1.39) (1.31) (1.37) (1.31) (1.35) (1.30)
Observations 4731 3321 1410
Standard deviation in parentheses. For the sake of comparability, the scores are normalised from 0 to 10.
Note 1: L1 = reject both lotteries; L2 = reject lottery 1, accept lottery 2; L3 = accept lottery 1, reject lottery 2; L4 = accept both lotteries.
Note 2: in panel B, individuals are asked to place themselves on a scale from 0 to 10. Prudence: 0 = you are very prudent, 10 = you like taking risks;
Patience: 0 = extremely impatient, 10 = extremely patient; Time preference: 0 = you take each day as it comes, 10 = you think of the future
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Table 2: Opinion on homogamy
For a couple to endure, it is All Couples Unmarried Divorced Widowed
preferable for the two spouses to have... M W M W M W M W M W
The same income level 18% 20% 15% 14% 27% 26% 38% 37% 15% 29%
The same social background 55% 61% 55% 60% 48% 54% 71% 72% 69% 72%
The same political sensibility 29% 38% 28% 35% 33% 42% 49% 43% 22% 46%
The same religious or 47% 54% 46% 53% 49% 54% 58% 57% 41% 63%
philosophical orientations
The same tastes 78% 80% 77% 77% 80% 81% 84% 86% 87% 88%
The same ethnic origin 36% 41% 37% 40% 28% 27% 50% 49% 48% 66%
Observations 2086 2557 1599 1671 347 446 81 222 59 218
Interpretation: in the whole sample, 18% of men think that for a couple to endure, it is preferable for the two spouses to have the same income level. For
women, the proportion is 20% (first line).
Note: M: men and W: women
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Table 3a: Income
M/F Yes No
Yes 64 69
48.1% 44.8% 51.9% 9.4%
No 79 661
10.6% 55.2% 89.4% 90.6%
Chi-square = 112.69 (dl=1)
Table 3b: Social origin
M/F Yes No
Yes 406 102
79.9% 75.5% 20.1% 29.8%
No 132 241
35.3% 24.5% 64.7% 70.2%
Chi-square = 177.53 (dl=1)
Table 3c: Political sensibility
M/F Yes No
Yes 184 84
68.7% 59.8% 31.3% 14.8%
No 124 484
20.4% 40.2% 79.6% 85.2%
Chi-square = 187.93 (dl=1)
Table 3d: Religion or philosophy
M/F Yes No
Yes 321 122
72.5% 70.0% 27.5% 28.9%
No 138 299
31.6% 30.0% 68.4% 71.1%
Chi-square = 145.71 (dl=1)
Table 3e: Tastes, leisures
M/F Yes No
Yes 589 94
86.2% 86.2% 13.8% 47.5%
No 95 105
47.5% 13.8% 52.5% 52.5%
Chi-square = 130.76 (dl=1)
Table 3f: Ethnic origin
M/F Yes No
Yes 233 109
68.1% 65.5% 31.9% 21.3%
No 123 404
23.3% 34.5% 76.7% 78.7%
Chi-square = 176.19 (dl=1)
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Table 4: Lotteries - Matrices
Men/Women L1 L2 - L3 - L4
L1 227 148
60.6% 64.7% 39.4% 33.3%
L2 - L3 - L4 124 296
29.5% 35.3% 70.5% 66.7%
Test: Chi-square = 76.35 (dl=1)
Note: L1 = reject both lotteries; L2 = reject lottery 1, accept lottery 2; L3 =
accept lottery 1, reject lottery 2; L4 = accept both lotteries.
Interpretation: (first line) out of the 794 couples who answered this question,
there are 227 in which both spouses rejected both lotteries. 60.6% of the men
who rejected both lotteries are in a couple with women who made the same choice;
64.7% of the women who rejected both lotteries are in a couple with men who
made the same choice. The percentages for men are read horizontally, those for
women (in italics) vertically.
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Table 5: Lotteries - Relationship between spousal preferences
Age categories
Dependent variable: All Age < 40 40 ≤ Age < 60 Age ≥ 60
male partner [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Female partner 0.308*** 0.299*** 0.273*** 0.322*** 0.279*** 0.295*** 0.379*** 0.364***
(0.035) (0.037) (0.066) (0.078) (0.053) (0.059) (0.065) (0.085)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 794 794 233 233 355 355 206 206
R2 0.089 0.185 0.070 0.380 0.072 0.266 0.144 0.497
Standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The dependent variable is the preference of the male partner. Columns
[1], [3], [5] and [7] present specifications without control variables; columns [2], [4], [6] and [8] with controls. See Appendix D.1 for the
full list of control variables.
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Table 6: Scales - Relationship between spousal preferences
Age categories
Dependent variable: All Age < 40 40 ≤ Age < 60 Age ≥ 60
male partner [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Panel A: patience
Female partner -0.061* -0.071* -0.186*** -0.158* -0.074 -0.027 0.004 -0.033
(0.035) (0.037) (0.069) (0.083) (0.054) (0.059) (0.064) (0.080)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 879 879 239 239 382 382 258 258
R2 0.003 0.130 0.030 0.344 0.005 0.220 0.000 0.290
Panel B: risk
Female partner 0.192*** 0.185*** 0.241*** 0.265*** 0.158*** 0.136** 0.188*** 0.211***
(0.034) (0.035) (0.071) (0.090) (0.053) (0.056) (0.059) (0.073)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 872 872 237 237 380 380 255 255
R2 0.036 0.155 0.046 0.291 0.023 0.260 0.039 0.307
Panel C: time preference
Female partner 0.294*** 0.234*** 0.127* 0.097 0.368*** 0.242*** 0.288*** 0.278***
(0.036) (0.036) (0.072) (0.082) (0.053) (0.057) (0.068) (0.077)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 877 877 238 238 383 383 256 256
R2 0.069 0.243 0.013 0.303 0.113 0.370 0.065 0.471
Standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The dependent variable is the preference of the male partner. Columns [1], [3], [5]
and [7] present specifications without control variables; columns [2], [4], [6] and [8] with controls. See Appendix D.1 for the full list of control variables.
Interpretation: for each variable, individuals are asked to place themselves on a scale from 0 to 10. Prudence: 0 = you are extremely prudent, 10 =
you like to take risks; Patience: 0 = extremely impatient, 10 = extremely patient; Time preference: 0 = you take each day as it comes, 10 = you
think of the future
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Table 7: Scores - Relationship between spousal preferences
Age categories
Dependent variable: All Age < 40 40 ≤ Age < 60 Age ≥ 60
male partner [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Panel A: altruism
Female partner 0.468*** 0.413*** 0.393*** 0.358*** 0.463*** 0.407*** 0.489*** 0.346***
(0.032) (0.034) (0.062) (0.078) (0.051) (0.059) (0.054) (0.059)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 905 905 242 242 391 391 272 272
R2 0.193 0.330 0.144 0.424 0.175 0.364 0.231 0.611
Panel B: patience
Female partner 0.368*** 0.266*** 0.217*** 0.203*** 0.324*** 0.263*** 0.396*** 0.351***
(0.035) (0.037) (0.065) (0.077) (0.057) (0.062) (0.061) (0.070)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 905 905 242 242 391 391 272 272
R2 0.108 0.269 0.044 0.415 0.076 0.285 0.134 0.421
Panel C: risk
Female partner 0.635*** 0.443*** 0.546*** 0.481*** 0.512*** 0.450*** 0.528*** 0.498***
(0.033) (0.036) (0.060) (0.071) (0.052) (0.064) (0.065) (0.079)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 905 905 242 242 391 391 272 272
R2 0.289 0.465 0.257 0.527 0.199 0.375 0.198 0.533
Panel D: time preference
Female partner 0.499*** 0.426*** 0.408*** 0.418*** 0.499*** 0.433*** 0.518*** 0.434***
(0.032) (0.032) (0.067) (0.071) (0.047) (0.057) (0.056) (0.065)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 905 905 242 242 391 391 272 272
R2 0.232 0.372 0.149 0.475 0.230 0.390 0.269 0.524
Standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The dependent variable is the preference of the male partner. Columns [1], [3], [5] and
[7] present specifications without control variables; columns [2], [4], [6] and [8] with controls. See Appendix D.1 for the full list of control variables.
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Table 8: Subscores - Relationship between spousal preferences
Dependent variable: Global Labour Family Finance Health Consumption Other
male partner [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Female partner:
Global 0.442***
(0.036)
Labour 0.268***
(0.035)
Family 0.305***
(0.034)
Finance 0.408***
(0.033)
Health 0.374***
(0.037)
Consumption 0.428***
(0.034)
Other 0.250***
(0.036)
Observations 905 905 905 905 905 905 905
R2 0.465 0.193 0.434 0.318 0.276 0.341 0.195
Standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The dependent variable is the preference of the male partner. All
specifications include control variables. See Appendix D.1 for the full list of control variables.
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Appendices
A The methodology of scoring
In this appendix, we present in greater details the methodology of scoring and more
especially the questions that we used. However, this article is an application of this
methodology to a specific topic. Arrondel and Masson (2013) fully describe the technical
details and the philosophy of the scoring method. This paper also presents the robustness
tests that have been implemented to validate this scoring method (justifications regard-
ing the choice and number of questions, robustness tests across the four surveys, internal
consistency...). As a consequence, the goal of our appendix is to provide to the reader all
the information needed to understand our work. In case the reader needs more specific
information, we invite him to read this publication.
A.1 Basic principles
The PATER surveys have enabled us to develop a methodology, drawing on all these
questions, to measure savers’ preferences with regard to risk and time. This method, tried
and tested on the different data, produces synthetic ordinal measurements, in the form of
scores, of individuals’ attitudes to risk, their preference for the present, and their family
altruism. The multiplication of the data has allowed us to verify that these indicators
are especially robust (in relation to the type of questions used, the characteristics and
factors explaining the scores, their correlations and their effects on wealth, etc.). First
developed on the data of the INSEE “Patrimoine 1998” survey and then the TNS-Sofres
survey 2002, this method was repeated on the last three waves of the PATER survey, in
2007, 2009 and 2011.
The five surveys contain a large number of more qualitative questions aiming to mea-
sure individual preferences with respect to risk and time on the basis of lottery choices, but
also according to attitudes, opinions and behaviour in different areas of life (health, work,
leisure, family, consumption, retirement, etc.). Thus, there are 57 questions measuring
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the attitude to risk, 27 for time-preference, 13 for family altruism and 16 for patience.
Let us give some examples of these questions. Concerning the attitude to risk, some
of the questions are somewhat trivial, of the kind: “Do you take an umbrella with you
when the weather forecast is uncertain?”, or “Do you park your car illegally?”, some are
lottery choices, and others relate to consumption practices: “Do you ever go to see a
show rather at random, at the risk of sometimes being disappointed?” or opinions: “Do
you agree with the statement that ’marriage is a form of insurance’?” or: “Are you
concerned by current health issues (AIDS, contaminated blood products, etc.)?”. One of
the questions of reference for identifying the time discount rate, for example, is: “Because
of an unexpectedly heavy workload, your employer asks you to forgo a week’s holiday this
year, in return for x extra days’ holiday next year. Would you agree?”. The proposed
answers are sometimes yes or no but for some questions the respondents can precise their
opinion (never, rarely, often or always for instance)25.
The first step consists in a priori allocation of each of the questions asked to one of the
four fields of preference. Inevitably, there is some overlapping, concerning the distinction
between short- and long-term, for example, and even more the fact that the future is both
uncertain and far-removed from the present. Thus, questions like “Do you think that it
is worth depriving yourself of some of life’s pleasures to gain a few extra years of life?”
and “To avoid health problems, do you watch your weight or your diet; do you practice a
sport?” have been allocated both to the category of risk preferences and to the category
of time preferences. Then, the marks are summed to obtain the final score.
Table A.1a presents examples of questions used to built the risk preference score; in
Tables A.2a and A.3 we do the same thing for time preference and altruism, respectively.
These tables also indicate the Cronbach’s alpha which measures the internal consistency
of scores. For all parameters, his score thus exhibits an acceptable degree of consistency.
25For the sake of presentation we did not report in Tables A.1a, A.2a and A.3 the exact wording of
the answers. Specifically, when there are more than 2 possible answers, we only present the “extreme”
answers (i.e those which define clear preferences - risk-loving or risk averse for risk, short-sighted or
far-sighted for time preference etc) but not the remaining answer(s) defining neutral preferences. As a
consequence, the answer “other” in the tables does not appear as such in the questionnaire. For instance,
when we ask people if parks in no-parking zones, “very often” or “often” increase their risk tolerance,
“never” or “rarely” increases their risk aversion. The other possible answer is “sometimes”. Of course,
depending on the question, this category varies.
44
A.2 Potential methodological issues
Like for the methodological aspects, the full details can be found in the list of publications
listed above. In this section, we respond to the main criticisms that can be made with
the scoring method.
Why choosing these specific questions and fields? What do we exactly measure with
these scores?
This approach has three main characteristics that can be perceived as criticisms.
Indeed, the scoring method follows a piecemeal (i), empiricist (ii) and agnostic (iii) ap-
proach.
• (i) The choice of questions and the life domains to be covered by these questions is
in part arbitrary but also contingent to the type of behaviour to be explained.
• (ii) For the four types of preferences, the number of selected questions is a purely
empirical issue. In other words, statistical analysis will alone tell if the global
score show a sufficient degree of internal consistency or if it preferable to introduce
different sub-scores per domain.
• (iii) The third characteristic of the scoring method is to be agnostic regarding
what the scores precisely measure. More specifically, we can wonder if the attitude
towards risk represent rational or irrational attitudes. Moreover, what theoretical
preference parameter would be this score most associated: risk aversion, prudence,
loss aversion, pessimism?
We are fully aware that no one question is by itself satisfactory and can bring accurate
information of a given preference. If a question is targeted on theory, it can appear to be
too abstract and generates too much noise. On the contrary, if it is more practical, its
interpretation remains too vague. In some situations, it is not possible to determine which
preference parameter is precisely revealed by the question under consideration. Moreover,
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some questions show, alone, little explanatory power of wealth. For a question like “Do
you often park in a forbidden zone?”, confounding factors can introduce some noise in
the answer. The method of aggregation might solve all these problems. Indeed, even if
there is no such thing like a central limit theorem that would allow us to treat framing
effect, endogeneity biases or other types of error, aggregation eliminates, globally and ex
ante, the biases and parasitic measurement errors (contrary to measurement like scales
or lotteries). Regarding (iii), this aggregation of answers also affects the interpretation of
the scores. The exact parameter measured (risk aversion or prudence for instance) is not
a crucial issue as long as the departure from expected utility and homothetic preferences
is limited: if Pierre is more risk-averse than Paul, then he should be also more prudent
most of the time.
Are the scores internally consistent?
The value of each score is the sum of the marks obtained in the coding procedure.
Our basic assumption is that most questions affected to risk or time preferences have a
common component and that the summation of these questions form a coherent whole.
Several precautions are taken in order to guarantee the internal consistency of scores.
First, we eliminate the questions that show a too small correlation with the sum of all
other items. Only few questions have to be dropped. Then in order to test the internal
consistency of the scores we compute the Cronbach coefficient alpha. This coefficient is
equal to:
κ =
n
n− 1(1−
n∑
i−1
σ2i
σ2
)
where n is the number of questions introduced in the score, σ2 the total variance of
the score and σ2i the variance of question i.
This coefficient is close to 0.7 for risk, which is the threshold of totally credible con-
sistency for psychometricians, and lower but still acceptable for time preference (around
0.5). It expresses the greater difficulty in identifying this parameter of preference
Other indirect validations developed such as the principal component analysis as well
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as the correlations between “sub-scores” provide evidence of the quality of the score.
Arrondel and Masson (2013) compare the results of the five waves (1998-2002-2007-2009-
2011) and demonstrate the stability of scores across surveys. The content of the scores is
constant over time: the time correlations (across survey) for scores is around 0.7, much
stronger than scales or lotteries; the rankings of the questions that the most relevant in
explaining the scores are very similar from one survey to another.
How can we say that scores are superior to standard measures?
There is no perfect way to measure subjective traits like preferences. The success
of the scoring method can be judged on two different grounds: the quality itself of the
measure and the explanatory power of scores on wealth-related behaviours.
First, four scores appear sufficient to capture the vast array of behaviours towards
risk and time. Moreover, compared with lotteries and scales, each score has a nice disper-
sion and a nice histogram (see appendix C). Scales suffer from a well-known problem of
anchoring in the middle of the interval. The lottery measurement takes only four values
and in most studies, including this paper, more than half of the sample are in the most
risk-tolerant group (those who refuse gambles 1 and 2).
The second way of evaluating scores is to see how they are explained by household’s
characteristics. The explanatory power of the scores regressions is much higher than
the one of scales or lotteries. Moreover, the effects of household’s characteristics (like
age, gender or marital status) on scores make sense given what we know from theory.
Furthermore, Arrondel and Masson (2007) show that scores are better at explaining risky
activities like playing games or self-declared preference for risky investment that the
standard measure of risk preference.
The strength of the scoring method lies in the ex ante correction of the noise a psycho-
metric procedure. The alternative consists in using econometric procedures to provide an
ex post correction (Kimball et al., 2009). The two methods lead to convergent conclusions
regarding the similarity of preferences within the household (between spouses or between
parents and children). At the same time, each method has drawbacks: ex ante correc-
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tion requires a large number of questions while ex post correction requires long panel data.
Table A.1a: Response frequencies and score construction: risk aversion
Nature of the question Risk-loving (%) Risk-averse (%) Neutral (%)
(-) (+)
Consumption/leisure/travel
Parks in no-parking zones (Very often, often = -1;
Never, rarely = +1; Other = 0)
27.7 61.7 10.6
Health/health risks/life expectancy
Precautionary visits to the doctor or dentist (Yes =
+1; No = 0)
38.2 60.2
Non-compulsory vaccinations (No = -1; Yes = +1;
Other = 0)
15.8 41.0 43.2
Wears seatbelt, respects speed limit (Very often, often
= -1; Never, rarely = +1; Other = 0)
2.1 12.2 85.7
Sacrifice today in order to live longer (No = -1; Yes =
+1; Other = 0)
9.5 9.6 80.9
Careful to keep in shape (No = -1; Yes = +1; Other =
0 )
8.8 7.9 83.3
Booster vaccination for ones children (Yes = 0; No =
-1)
5.0 95.0
Work/income/career
Looks for novelty and responsibility in a job (Yes = -1;
Other = 0)
19.4 80.6
Has taken risks in their career (Yes = -1; No = 0 ) 37.3 62.7
Leisure behaviour represents a potential risk for career
(Yes = -1; No = 0)
9.5 90.5
Risky job changes (Yes = -1; No = 0) 30.7 69.3
Recommends that friends and family take risks in their
careers (Yes definitely = -1; No, never = +1; Other =
0)
8.8 7.9 83.3
Would change economic sector in the face of
substantial economic risk
50.0 50.0
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Table A.1b: Response frequencies and score construction: risk aversion (ctd)
Nature of the question Risk-loving (%) Risk-averse (%) Neutral (%)
(-) (+)
Retirement
Worried that might end their life in a retirement home
(Yes = +1; No = 0)
66.5 33.5
Saves in order to avoid ending their life in a retirement
home (Yes = +1; No = 0)
78.5 21.5
Would prefer lower social security contributions against
a less generous pension (Yes, without precautionary
saving = -1; No, too risky = +1; Other = 0)
1.4 28.7 69.9
Family/Intergenerational Transfers
“Marriage is an insurance policy” (Strongly disagree =
-1; Strongly agree = +1; Other = 0)
17.4 13.7 68.9
“Choosing a partner is risky” (Strongly disagree = -1;
Strongly agree = +1; Other = 0)
4.9 23.1 72.0
“You can’t sign up for marriage without testing it first”
(Strongly disagree = -1; Strongly agree = +1; Other =
0)
8.5 24.4 67.1
“Having children is an insurance policy for ones old
age” (No = -1; Yes = 0)
80.2 19.8
“The decision to have children is a risky one” (Strongly
disagree = -1; Strongly agree = +1; Other = 0)
18.5 12.7 68.8
The decision to have children is a lifelong commitment
(No = -1; Yes = 0)
5.0 95.0
Wishes to protect their spouse financially in case of
their own death (No = -1; Yes = 0)
6.8 93.2
Constantly keeps watch over their children (No = -1;
Yes, always = +1; Other = 0)
10.9 33.0 56.1
Would encourage their children to take risks (Yes,
definitely = -1; No = +1; Other = 0)
2.6 28.9 68.5
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Table A.1c: Response frequencies and score construction: risk aversion (end)
Nature of the question Risk-loving (%) Risk-averse (%) Neutral (%)
(-) (+)
Gambling
Bets on horses (very or fairly often=-1, rarely=0,
never=1)
4.5 80.4 15.1
Plays the lottery (very often=-1, fairly often or
rarely=0, never=1)
8.9 61.2 29.9
Plays slot machines (very or fairly often=-1, rarely=0,
never=1)
1.2 77.4 21.4
Bets at the casino (very or fairly often=-1, rarely=0,
never=1)
0.3 90.2 9.5
Other
Buys transport tickets well in advance (No = -1; well
in advance = +1; a little in advance = 0)
8.0 19.3 72.7
Turns up well in time for trains and planes (No = -1;
well in time = +1; a little in advance = 0)
4.2 20.1 75.7
Takes precautions in case the weather turns out nasty
(No, never = -1; Yes, always = +1; other = 0)
42.7 55.9 1.4
Cronbach’s alpha 0.68
Source: PATER 2007
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Table A.2a: Response frequencies and score construction: time preference
Nature of the question Lives from (%) Farsighted (%) Neutral (%)
day to day
(-) (+)
Consumption/leisure/travel
Wishes to enjoy windfalls as quickly as possible (Yes =
+1; No = 0)
24.7 75.3
Buys transport tickets well in advance (No = -1; well
in advance = +1; a little in advance = 0)
8.0 19.3 72.7
Turns up well in time for trains and planes (No = -1;
well in time = +1; a little in advance = 0)
4.2 20.1 75.7
Would put holidays off for one year in order to increase
their duration (No = +1; Yes, with at most only one or
two more days= -1; Other = 0)
21.4 17.5 61.1
Health/health risks/life expectancy
Sacrifice today in order to live longer (No = -1; Yes =
+1; Other = 0)
9.5 9.6 80.9
Plays sport or goes to the gym (Regularly= -1; Never=
+1; Occasionally= 0 )
54.4 25.9 19.7
Work/income/career
Favours free time in choice of job (Yes = 1; No = 0) 31.5 68.5
Would prefer National Service to be as short as
possible, rather than a longer service which is spread
out over time(No = +1; Yes = 0)
39.7 60.3
Retirement
Worried that might end their life in a retirement home
(Yes = +1; No = 0)
66.5 33.5
Would have trouble in paying for a retirement home
(Yes if saved more= -1; Yes without saving more= +1;
No = 0)
47.0 11.4 41.6
Would prefer early retirement against a lower pension
after the age of 85 (No = -1; Yes = +1; Other = 0)
1.4 86.3 12.3
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Table A.2b: Response frequencies and score construction: time preference (ctd)
Nature of the question Lives from (%) Farsighted (%) Neutral (%)
day to day
(-) (+)
Family/Intergenerational Transfers
”Having children is an insurance policy for ones old
age” (No = -1; Yes = 0)
80.2 19.8
The decision to have children is a lifelong commitment
(No = -1; Yes = 0)
6.5 93.5
Wishes to protect their spouse financially in case of
their own death (No = -1; Yes = 0)
6.8 93.2
My parents tried to teach me to save money (Yes=-1;
No=+1; Other=0)
22.9 75.4 1.7
We should teach children and teenagers how to save
money (Yes = -1; No = +1; Other=0)
6.4 90.9 2.8
Other
Aware of environmental problems (No = +1; Other =
0)
20.8 79.2
Ready to sacrifice their standard of living to leave the
world in good shape (Yes, very much so = -1; No =
+1; Yes, to an extent = 0)
15.4 42.3 42.3
Cronbach’s alpha 0.56
Source: PATER 2007
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Table A.3: Response frequencies and score construction: altruism
Nature of the question Egoist (%) Altruist (%) Neutral (%)
(-) (+)
The decision to have children is a lifelong commitment (No = -1;
Yes = 0)
5.0 95.0
Wishes to protect their spouse financially in case of their own
death (No = -1; Yes = 0)
6.8 93.2
Should leave to our children as much as we received ourselves
(Strongly agree = +1; Strongly disagree = -1; Other = 0)
72.4 25.2 2.4
Inheritance behaviour inspired by that of my parents (Yes = +1;
No = -1)
52.9 47.1
Parents should spend their money as they wish, even if it means
leaving no legacy (Strongly agree = +1; Strongly disagree = -1;
Other = 0)
87.9 11.1 1.0
It is a good thing that parents make sacrifices for their children
(Strongly agree = +1; Strongly disagree = -1; Other = 0)
92.4 6.3 1.3
Would favour lower inheritance taxes on transmission to blood
relatives (Strongly agree = +1; Strongly disagree = -1; Other =
0)
5.5 85.9 8.6
Is in favour of the freedom to bequeath (Strongly agree = +1;
Strongly disagree = -1; Other = 0)
46.5 52.1 1.3
Cronbach’s alpha 0.45
Source: PATER 2007
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B General descriptive statistics
Table B.1: Characteristics of households
Number of children 1.98
Children living at home 1.04
Marital status
Married 86.2%
Non-married 13.8%
Housing situation
Home-owner (or home-buyer) 77.5%
Tenant (council flat) 7.5%
Tenant (other) 11.6%
Rent-free tenants 2.7%
Other 0.6%
Comparison of wealth on first meeting:
Man > Woman 21.1%
Man < Woman 19.6%
Man = Woman 19.1%
Man = Woman = 0 40.2%
Who holds the purse strings?
Man 25.4%
Woman 33.8%
Both 40.7%
Existence of a joint account 86.2
Overall wealth of household
Less than 8000e 8.1%
Between 8000 and 14999e 4.2%
Between 15000 and 39999e 5.0%
Between 40000 and 74999e 5.0%
Between 75000 and 149999e 18.0%
Between 150000 and 224999e 22.9%
Between 225000 and 299999e 13.2%
Between 300000 and 499999e 14.9%
Between 450000 and 749999e 6.4%
More than 750000e 2.3%
Net monthly income of the household
Less than 300e 0.2%
Between 300 and 600e 0.4%
Between 601 and 900e 0.6%
Between 901 and 1200e 4.9%
Between 1201 and 1500e 8.6%
Between 1501 and 1900e 15.8%
Between 1901 and 2300e 17.4%
Between 2301 and 2700e 13.3%
Between 2701 and 3000e 10.8%
Between 3001 and 3800e 15.3%
Between 3801 and 5300e 9.0%
Between 5301 and 6900e 2.9%
More than 6901e 0.9%
Observations 905
Field: All cohabiting households for which we have information about
both spouses.
Source: PATER 2007
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Table B.2: Assets
Types of financial investment:
None 11%
CEL, PEL (home-purchase saving account) 50%
Livret A, livret bleu (tax-free saving accounts) 63%
Other savings accounts 31%
PERP (pension savings plan) 6%
PER, PEP (pension savings plan) 12%
Assurance-vie (investment/insurance plan) 45%
Life insurance 15%
Complementary retirement savings plan 10%
French-listed shares 20%
Foreign-listed shares 5%
Bonds 6%
SICAV or FCP (mutual funds) 15%
PEE, FCPE (employee savings plans) 18%
PEA (equity savings plan) 24%
Value of financial investments
Less than 1500e 12%
Between 1500 and 2999e 9%
Between 3000 and 7999e 16%
Between 8000 and 14999e 14%
Between 15000 and 29999e 14%
Between 30000 and 44999e 10%
Between 45000 and 74999e 10%
Between 75000 and 149999e 8%
More than 150000e 6%
Share of these investments...
Considered risky 11%
If > 0 21%
Invested in pension schemes 12%
If > 0 28%
Observations 905
Field: All cohabiting households for which we have information about
both spouses.
Source: PATER 2007
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Table B.3: Individual characteristics
Man Woman
Age 51.5 49.2
Divorced in the past 8.7% 6.9%
Current professional activity:
Employed 62.6% 55.6%
Job seeking 1.9% 4.9%
Inactive having worked in the past 33.0% 23.8%
Inactive having never worked 2.6% 12.5%
Other 0.0% 3.2%
Individual yearly income:
Less than 8000e 6.4% 26.1%
Between 8000 and 11999e 12.6% 16.0%
Between 12000 and 15999e 16.6% 16.6%
Between 16000 and 19999e 21.1% 12.3%
Between 20000 and 29999e 25.9% 17.2%
Between 30000 and 39999e 10.7% 3.6%
More than 40000e 6.7% 1.9%
No reply 0.1% 6.3%
Inheritance or gifts received 41.9% 43.5%
Social origin (subjective):
Well-off 9.1% 12.5%
Modest 16.7% 18.0%
Neither 74.2% 69.4%
Level of education attained:
Primary 10.9% 9.5%
Secondary 7.0% 9.2%
Vocational certificate (CAP, BEP) 32.6% 25.2%
High school studies 21.2% 26.4%
Higher vocational certificate (IUT, BTS) 11.7% 11.6%
Higher education 1st cycle 3.9% 6.4%
Higher education 2nd cycle 5.7% 8.1%
Higher education 3rd cycle 7.1% 3.7%
Socioeconomic position (7 categories:)
Farmers 3.8% 1.8%
Tradesmen, shopkeepers, entrepreneurs 7.1% 3.1%
Liberal professions 17.3% 7.4%
Intermediate professions 21.8% 20.1%
Employees 15.6% 44.3%
Unskilled workers 33.0% 8.1%
Inactive 1.4% 15.3%
Observations 905 905
Field: All cohabiting households for which we have information about both spouses.
Source: PATER 2007
Remark: For the socio-professional category, retired people are classified in the most
recent category they were in before retiring.
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C Distributions of risk and time preferences
Figure 1: Distribution - Attitudes to risk
Score RM
Score RW
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
-2
4
-1
6
-1
4
-1
2
-1
0
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8
10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26
Figure 2: Distribution - Time preferences
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Definition: the distribution for men is in blue; the distribution for women is
in red.
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Table C.1: Preference measurements - distributions
Lotteries Scales Scores
Risk Patience Foresight Altruism Impatience Risk Time pref.
Male 0.097*** -0.036 -0.055 -0.035 -0.170*** 0.145*** -0.497*** 0.138***
(0.001) (0.615) (0.475) (0.642) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 0.000 0.009*** 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.003** -0.027*** 0.028*** -0.013***
(0.964) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.026) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Married 0.028 -0.208 -0.043 0.525*** 0.008 0.013 0.204*** -0.461***
(0.684) (0.177) (0.795) (0.001) (0.930) (0.881) (0.007) (0.000)
Non-married 0.172** -0.014 0.126 0.150 -0.242** 0.178 -0.234** -0.260***
(0.041) (0.048) (0.944) (0.466) (0.030) (0.107) (0.014) (0.009)
Single 0.199** 0.169 0.273 -0.031 -0.628*** -0.028 -0.040 -0.060
(0.014) (0.359) (0.165) (0.876) (0.000) (0.793) (0.659) (0.531)
Divorced 0.017 0.350* 0.212 -0.285 -0.214* 0.170 -0.157 -0.290***
(0.850) (0.083) (0.324) (0.183) (0.064) (0.140) (0.114) (0.005)
Constant 1.81*** 4.33*** 4.61*** 5.25*** 6.58*** 5.27*** 4.75*** 5.19***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R2 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.11 0.21 0.06
Observations 4368 4616 4625 4619 4731 4731 4731 4731
P-value between brackets; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
For the scales and scores, the dependent variable is expressed as an absolute value. For the sake of comparability between scores and
scales, we have normalised the scores from 0 to 10 (as in table 1). For marital status, the reference category is widowed.
Interpretation: the coefficient -0.170 (1st row, 4th column) signifies that, for family altruism, the men’s score is, on average, 0.17
points lower than that of women (when the score has been normalised from 0 to 10).
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D Empirical strategy and supplementary results
D.1 The construction of control variables
In this appendix, we provide full information regarding the control variables and their
construction. The full list of individual control variables is the following: age, income,
occupation (7 positions: farmer; tradesman, shopkeeper or entrepreneur; liberal profes-
sion; intermediate profession; employee; unskilled worker; inactive), education (8 posi-
tions: primary, secondary, vocational certificate, high school studies, higher vocational
certificate, higher education 1st cycle, higher education 2nd cycle, higher education 3rd
cycle), inheritance/gifts received (dummy), occupation of the father (5 positions: farmer;
tradesman, shopkeeper or entrepreneur; liberal profession; intermediate profession; em-
ployee and unskilled worker), existence of past divorce, religious beliefs (“Do you believe in
any religion?”), religious education (“In which religion have you been raised?”: Catholic,
Anglican, Protestant, Orthodox Christian, Jewish, Muslim, other or none), opinion on
homogamy and on marriage and probable divorce (see below).
Some variables are measured at the household level: presence of children, inequality
between spouses (see below), duration of relationship before cohabitation (less than three
months, between 3 and 6 months, between 6 and 12 months, between 1 and 2 years,
between 2 and 5 years or between 5 and 10 years). Given the absence of precise geo-
graphical information, for each specification with control variables we control for the size
of the city of residence: rural area, between 2,000 and 5,000 inhabitants, between 5,000
and 10,000, between 10,000 and 20,000, between 20,000 and 50,000, between 50,000 and
100,000, between 100,000 and 200,000, more than 200,000 or parisian urban area.
We can classify the variables we use into several categories: demography, human or
physical endowments, social prestige, social origin, religious or familial beliefs. These
controls cover most of the dimensions that can somehow influence the choice of spouse on
top of preferences. By controlling for these variables, we assume that the correlation of
residuals is the relevant relationship we want to measure. This list of control follows the
econometric specification used by Dohmen et al. (2012). Some variables are missing in
our data: height, health status and ethnicity. However, Dohmen and his coauthors do not
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provide full details about the effect of these variables on the relationship between spouses.
Inequalities between partners:
One category of variables is used to describe the degree of inequality between spouses.
Several dimensions are studied: income, social origin, wealth at the time of meeting and
age. For income, a couple is considered unequal if the man is in the top decile of the
income distribution for men and the woman is below the median of the income distribu-
tion for women (or vice versa). For social origin, we consider the origin of individuals
to be well-off if their father is (or was) a skilled tradesman, shopkeeper or entrepreneur,
a liberal professional, executive or in an intermediate profession. If this variable does
not have the same value for both partners, then they have different social origins. We
also compare the wealth at the time of meeting by using use a question asking individ-
uals about their comparative wealth at the moment of their meeting. There are four
possible replies: larger, smaller, equal or not applicable (no wealth). Thus, the couple
is considered unequal if one of the first two answers is chosen. Lastly, if the age differ-
ence between the two partners is more than 5 years, then the couple is considered unequal.
Opinion on homogamy:
To synthesise the opinion on homogamy, we return to the questions used in section
5.2. We consider that a person has a positive opinion of homogamy if they think that
it is preferable that the two partners have the same income level, the same social origin
and the same tastes.
Marriage perceived as risky:
To construct this variable, we use a series of questions addressing individuals’ opinions
about the family. We construct three binary variables, (one for each question). For the
first variable, we consider that marriage is perceived as risky if the individual does not
agree that marriage represents “security” (individual, emotional, etc.) (1st variable); if
the individual thinks that choosing one’s partner is not without risk (2nd variable); or if,
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before getting married, one should live together for a trial period (3rd variable).
Probable divorce:
To calculate the possibility of future divorce, we use a series of questions addressed to
the interviewees. They are asked to indicate, on a scale of 0 to 10, the probability that a
given event will occur in the next five years. The variable “Probable divorce” is equal to
1 if the interviewee situates between 5 and 10 the probability for the event “experiencing
a separation or divorce”.
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D.2 How are partners perceived?
One of the particularities of the results is that the correlation between spouses in terms of
patience varies according to the indicator used. With self-evaluation scales, the correlation
is negative (Table 6), whereas it is positive when we use scores. The aim of this appendix
is to explain where this difference comes from and why it can be partly explained by the
relevance of the scale as an appropriate measure of preferences (at least as far as patience
is concerned).
Firstly, there is a factor that reduces the importance of this divergence between the
two results. Patience is the parameter for which we obtain the weakest correlation with
the scores. So although differences in level appear, scales and scores still tend to share
the same hierarchy of correlations. Secondly, it appears that patience, much more than
prudence or foresight, is poorly taken into account by scales. To demonstrate this, we
use a series of questions that inform us about the perception by one spouse of their
partner’s attitudes to risk and time. Concretely, for each parameter measured by the
scales (prudence, patience and time preference), we have two questions: “on a scale of 0
to 10, where would you place yourself?” and ”on the same scale, where would you place
your partner?” These two questions, addressed to both spouses, allow us to measure
the correlation between the way the individual perceives him/herself and the way their
partner perceives them. For more clarity, we designate EH the judgements that men
make on themselves via the scales and EH* the judgements that women make on their
respective partners. We carry out the same operation for women, with EF denoting their
self-evaluations and EF* the judgement of their partners. Table D.1 presents the results
of these correlations for each parameter.
The main information that we can draw from the first part of this table is that in-
dividuals are not very good judges of their partners’ attitudes, although women appear
to do better than men. More importantly for our purpose, we can see that it is for the
parameter of patience that we obtain the weakest correlation. In the second part of the
table, we observe the individuals’ perception of homogamy. When compared with the
results in table 11, it can be seen that individuals tend to believe that their partners
62
resemble them more than we actually observe in reality. This observation is also valid
for patience, where we move from a negative correlation (-0.06) to a positive correlation
(+0.10). Thus, we can see that the subjective nature of this indicator tends to produce
noticeably different results according to the identity of the “judge”. All in all, this di-
vergence in results partly explains the difference between scales and scores, notably as
regards the parameter of patience.
Table D.1: Preferences and partner’s perception
Correlations Patience Risk Time pref.
[1] [2] [3]
ρ EH EH* 0.238*** 0.323*** 0.445***
ρ EF EF* 0.168*** 0.228*** 0.402***
ρ EH EF* 0.097*** 0.594*** 0.551***
ρ EF EH* 0.112*** 0.588*** 0.557***
Observations 869 861 870
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Interpretation: the first line in the table presents the correlation between
the score (on the scale of 0 to 10) that the man gives himself, EH , and
the score that his partner gives him, EH*; in the second line, the roles are
reversed (ρ EF EF *). The third line measures the correlation between the
score that the man gives himself, EH , and the score he gives his partner,
EF *; in the fourth line the same operation is repeated for women (ρ EF EH*).
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D.3 Robustness tests for age
Table D.2: Scores - Robustness test for age
Age<40
Dependent variable: Age<35 All Without children With children
male partner [1] [2] [3] [4]
Panel A: altruism
Female partner 0.471*** 0.358*** 0.501** 0.299***
(0.121) (0.078) (0.185) (0.072)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 131 242 47 195
R2 0.637 0.424 0.503 0.162
Panel B: patience
Female partner 0.404*** 0.203*** 0.0852 0.208***
(0.120) (0.077) (0.192) (0.075)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 131 242 47 195
R2 0.558 0.415 0.347 0.167
Panel C: risk
Female partner 0.469*** 0.481*** 0.719*** 0.495***
(0.117) (0.071) (0.139) (0.068)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 131 242 47 195
R2 0.601 0.527 0.552 0.305
Panel D: time preference
Female partner 0.226* 0.418*** 0.503** 0.396***
(0.132) (0.076) (0.204) (0.068)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 131 242 47 195
R2 0.576 0.475 0.438 0.259
Standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All specifications include the full set of control
variables. See Appendix D.1 for the full list of control variables.
64
D.4 The decomposition of scores
In this section, the aim is to identify the role of control variables in the comparison of
spouses. We focus on scores only because this measurement is the most affected by control
variables. Table D.3 presents the decomposition of correlations for the four dimensions
studied. For the attitude to risk, the correlation obtained without any control is 0.635.
In other words, if the man is twice as risk-averse as the average, then his spouse will
herself be 63.5% more risk-averse than the average for women. The raw correlations for
the other parameters are all significant (at 1%) and vary between 0.37 and 0.5. The part
explained by the different specifications is relatively low, since we explain, at the most,
30% of the relationship between spouses.
For family altruism, we observe a raw correlation of 0.47. With the introduction of
individual characteristics, the coefficient is equal to 0.41. Thus, all the control variables
taken together do not explain more than 12% of the elasticity between spouses. Two
categories of variables explain most of this reduction: the family situation (presence of
children and divorce of (at least) one partner) and religious beliefs/education.
Spouses are less similar in terms of patience, but the part explained is much larger.
The raw correlation is 0.37; the net correlation is 0.27. Adding the age of the spouses into
the specification reduces the coefficient by nearly 20%. However, the other specifications
do not perceptibly increase the level of explanation.
Risk aversion is the variable for which we observe the strongest correlation between
spouses, with a coefficient of 0.635. Moreover, the part explained by the different speci-
fications is nearly one third (net correlation equal to 0.44). Three categories of variables
tend to significantly reduce this correlation: age (which alone explains more than 20% of
the elasticity), the religious beliefs/education and the opinion on marriage.
Lastly, time preference has a profile fairly similar to that of family altruism. The
correlation is quite strong (0.5) but the part explained by the different specifications is
very low (less than 15%). Social position, income and religious beliefs/education are the
main explaining factors.
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Table D.3: Individual determinants of similarity between spouses (scores)
Dependent variable: Family altruism Patience Risk Time pref.
male partner Coeff. R2 % explained Coeff. R2 % explained Coeff. R2 % explained Coeff. R2 % explained
Female partner:
Without control 0.47*** 0.193 0.37*** 0.108 0.64*** 0.289 0.50*** 0.232
Age 0.47*** 0.193 0.2% 0.29*** 0.161 21.2% 0.51*** 0.361 19.4% 0.49*** 0.241 2.6%
Income, occupation, 0.45*** 0.244 3.6% 0.27*** 0.219 25.5% 0.51*** 0.396 20.0% 0.46*** 0.314 8.2%
education
Inheritance/gifts received, 0.46*** 0.277 1.7% 0.27*** 0.229 26.9% 0.50*** 0.403 20.6% 0.46*** 0.329 8.0%
father’s occupations
Children, divorce 0.43*** 0.293 7.3% 0.27*** 0.235 26.9% 0.50*** 0.404 21.1% 0.46*** 0.330 8.0%
Inequality between spouses (age, 0.43*** 0.296 7.7% 0.27*** 0.238 26.4% 0.51*** 0.405 20.5% 0.46*** 0.334 8.2%
social origin, wealth, income)
Duration of relationship before 0.43*** 0.298 8.5% 0.27*** 0.243 26.9% 0.49*** 0.415 23.1% 0.46*** 0.339 8.4%
cohabitation
Religious beliefs and 0.41*** 0.316 12.8% 0.28*** 0.253 25.0% 0.47*** 0.434 26.8% 0.43*** 0.363 13.0%
education
Opinion on homogamy and 0.41*** 0.330 11.8% 0.27*** 0.269 27.7% 0.44*** 0.465 30.2% 0.43*** 0.372 14.6%
marriage, probable divorce
Observations 905 905 905 905
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The control variables are added one after another. The first specification has no control variable; in the second, we control for age; in the third, we control for age,
income, occupation and education of the spouses and so on.
Interpretation: for each type of preference, the first column indicates the coefficient of correlation corresponding to the specification, the second column indicates the R2, and the third column
indicates the share of the initial elasticity that is explained by the addition of control variables. For example, for patience, controlling for the age of the spouses reduces the correlation from 0.37
to 0.29; we therefore explain 1 - (0.29/0.368)=21.2% of the initial correlation.
